Business Organization and Corporate Issues Business Resource Materials
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Entrepreneurship Law Editorial Team
Books
Daniel Hjorth, ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND ORGANIZATION: POLITICS, PASSION, AND CREATION (2010).
Product Description (from Amazon): Working from a unique standpoint and challenging the orthodoxy on entrepreneurship this book explores the possibilities of entrepreneurship in organizations and entrepreneurship in organization creation whilst re-anchoring entrepreneurship within a broader disciplinary approach.
Daniel Hjorth, Rewriting Entrepreneurship: For a New Perspective on Organisational Creativity (2003).
Abstract (from Amazon Product Description):
During the 1990s in particular entrepreneurship emerged as a hot topic. Entrepreneurship has now become more central, natural and, not the least, managerially correct and legitimised. Daniel Hjorth argues that the entrepreneurial qualities of entrepreneurship do not survive the managerialisation that takes place in enterprise discourse. Hjorth shows us that entrepreneurship is reserved a specific place predominantly by management thinking, and that management has come to exhaust the official imagination of what entrepreneurship can be. A rewriting is suggested. Opening up to influences from philosophy, literature and cultural studies, Hjorth takes us to an alternative way of thinking and thus practicing entrepreneurship. Through this rewriting our engagement with entrepreneurship is intensified as entrepreneurship becomes entrepreneurial.
Ivan Pongracic, Jr., EMPLOYEES AND ENTREPRENEURSHIP: CO-ORDINATION AND SPONTANEITY IN NON-HIERARCHAL BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS (2009).
Product Description (from Amazon): Over the last few decades, there has been a great deal of management literature recommending the removal of firms' hierarchies and the empowerment of employees. The decentralization of decision-making and flattening of managerial hierarchies within business firms can best be understood as a response to situations where employees hold knowledge that is superior to that held by firms' owners and managers. Decentralizing decision-making in those circumstances allows firms to utilize their employees' superior personal knowledge, often by encouraging them to act in creative, entrepreneurial ways, while requiring some reliance on intra-firm spontaneous order processes to co-ordinate the activities of the employees.
Ivan Pongracic, Jr., Entrepreneurship and Flattening of Hierarchical Structures Within Business Organizations (2004).
Abstract (from author):
This resource examines the implications of the intra-firm Hayekian knowledge problem to the firms' internal administrative and managerial structures. My thesis is that decentralization of decision-making within firms is a response to the situation where employees hold economic knowledge superior to that held by the managers. Allowing employees to make their own decisions on how to use the resources of the firm by removing much of the hierarchical managerial structure gives the employees scope for entrepreneurial action and enables firms to utilize their employees' personal knowledge. This intra-firm decentralization and hierarchical flattening can work when employees are not motivated strictly by pecuniary interests. The more complex motivations can reduce the moral hazard problem in firms emphasized by much of New Institutional Economics. In addition, firms with decentralized decision-making rely on some form of intra-firm spontaneous order to coordinate the activities of their employees. The employees' mutual orientation is made possible by the firms' adoption of rules that facilitate an emergence of an organizational culture consisting of a shared set of intersubjective meanings. These elements of decentralized firms exist to a more limited extent in even the most hierarchical of firms, and therefore my analysis adds an important and heretofore overlooked component to the general theory of the firm.
Articles
Brian J. Broughman, Entrepreneur Wealth and the Value of Limited Liability (2011), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1761011.
Abstract (from author):
This paper uses variation in entrepreneur wealth to test the importance of limited liability in choice of organizational form. Economic theory suggests that wealthy entrepreneurs demand liability protection to shield their personal assets. Yet, despite an extensive theoretical literature on limited liability there are no empirical studies which directly address this issue. Using restricted-access data from the Kauffman Firm Survey, I find that for every $100,000 of exposed personal wealth an entrepreneur is 2.1% to 2.6% more likely to form a corporation or LLC. I use state-level property exemptions to create exogenous variation in an entrepreneur’s liability exposure. This study provides support for the economic theory of limited liability and improves our understanding of an entrepreneur’s choice of organizational form.
Cheryl Carleton Asher et al., Towards a Property Rights Foundation for a Stakeholder Theory of the Firm, 9 J. Mgmt. & Governance 5 (2005).
Online Resources
CalPERS, Structure and Responsibilities
http://www.calpers.ca.gov/index.jsp?bc=/about/organization/board/structure-responsibilities.xml
Escape from Cubicle Nation, http://www.escapefromcubiclenation.com/ (last visited June 6, 2011).
My Own Business, Section Four, Business Organization
http://www.myownbusiness.org/s4/
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